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I. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, the United States began using submarines to place
recording devices on an underwater sea cable off the coast of Eastern
Russia.' The cable transported communication between two Russian
bases and every so often the United States would retrieve the recordings
and listen for useful information. 2 The operation was known as Ivy Bells
and although it was discontinued in 1981,3 the technique of tapping
underwater sea cables to gather information is still used today.4
Governments use many methods to gather data as they try to guard
against terrorist attacks and otherwise protect national security. 5 Nonstate actors and states often try to prevent their communications and other
data from being read by encrypting it.6 For example, HTTPS7 and SSL 8
9
are commonly used together to encrypt data traveling over the internet.
1. Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping,
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepylong-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/.
2. Id.
3. See id.
(An NSA employee sold information about the program to the KGB).
4. New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special EavesdroppingAbility, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/politics/new-nuclear-sub-is-said-to-have-special-ea
vesdropping-ability.html.
5. Charlie Savage, Edward Wyatt & Peter Baker, US. Confirms that It Gathers Online
Data Overseas,N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizoncalls.html?pagewanted=all.
6. See Press Release, Blue Coat Systems, Inc., Blue Coat Launches Encrypted Traffic
Management Ready CertificationProgram (Mar. 3, 2015), available at https://www.bluecoat.
com/company/press-releases/blue-coat-launches-encrypted-traffic-management-ready-certificat
ion-program (discussing the use of encryption by certain non-state actors).
7. Jennifer Kyrnin, What is HTTPS - Why Secure a Web Site, ABOUT, http://webdesign.
about.com/od/ecommerce/a/aa070407.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
8. What Is SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) and What Are SSL Certificates?, DIGICERT,
https://www.digicert.com/ssl.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
9. Press Release, Blue Coat Systems, Inc., Blue Coat Launches Encrypted Traffic
Management Ready Certification Program (Mar. 3, 2015), availableat https://www.bluecoat.
com/company/press-releases/blue-coat-launches-encrypted-traffic-management-readycertificat
ion-program.
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States are interested in developing encryption techniques that no one else
can break while maintaining techniques that can break encrypted data
created by other states.' 0 For example, the European Union, Switzerland,
and the NSA are all trying to develop quantum computing, which may be
useful for breaking encryption."I
The international law principle of sovereignty applies to territorial
decryption activities and provides guidance on when a state may break
the encryption on messages sent by other states.' 2 However, breaking
encryption on data that is traveling on the high seas or traveling within a
state's territory does not violate sovereignty.1 3 This is true for every
method of breaking encryption that I discuss in this paper. However,
states must be careful of communications that meet the diplomacy and
consular protection requirements and must leave these communications
alone if they are found. 14 States may also share data gathered from their
territory with other states without violating sovereignty. 15 Finally, there
is no consensus on whether defeating encryption by installing malware
on computers in foreign states violates sovereignty or not. 16 Current state
practice seems to suggest, however, that it is not a violation of
sovereignty. 17
In Part II, I will explain the basics of encryption, networking, and how
data travels over the internet securely. In Part III, I will explain the aspects
of sovereignty that are most applicable to breaking encryption and
tapping fiber optics cables on the high seas. In Part IV, I will discuss
several techniques for gathering data and breaking encryption' 8 that may
10.

NSA Encryption, PRODUCTS CRYPTO MUSEUM, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/

usa/nsa.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
11. Steven Rich & Barton Gellman, NSA Seeks to Build Quantum Computer that Could
Crack Most Types of Encryption, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-e
ncryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11 e3-8def-a33011492df2_story.html.
12. Wolf Heintschel von Heinegg, TerritorialSovereignty and Neutrality in Cyberspace,

89 INT'L L. STuD. 123, 126-27 (2013).
13.

See INT'L GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 16-18 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN

MANUAL] (discussing principles of sovereignty as they relate to cyber law); U.N. Convention on
the Lawofthe Seaarts. 86, 89, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, availableat http://www.un.org/

depts/los/convention agreements/texts/unclos/unclos e.pdf.
14. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 26; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art.
27, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
15. Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financingfor
Development: Response Soughtfrom InternationalEconomic Law, 27 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV.
219, 249 (2004).
16.

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 16.

17. See Hiroshi Shinotsuka, How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates,
SYMANTEC (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-priv
ate-keys-digital-certificates (discussing how multiple states use malware).
18. The techniques include brute force attacks, man in the middle attacks that require the
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be in use by states today, and how the law applies to each technique. I
will discuss which scenarios do not violate sovereignty and which
scenarios do violate sovereignty.
II. ENCRYPTION AND ROUTE SELECTION FOR DATA
TRAVELING ON THE INTERNET

A. How DataIs Encrypted
Cryptology is the science of making and breaking codes.' 9 It includes
cryptography, or making codes, and cryptanalysis, the breaking of
codes.20 The original, readable message is known as the plaintext.2 '
Unreadable text that comes from encrypting the plaintext is known as
ciphertext.22 Decryption is the act of converting the ciphertext into
plaintext using a key. 23 When encrypting and decrypting a message, a key
is necessary to make a cryptographic algorithm work correctly. 24 The key
is typically a special number that is used by an algorithm. 25 Anyone that
possesses a key that was used to encrypt some data is able to decrypt the
same data using the key.26 The key must be kept secret, otherwise anyone
would be able to decrypt the ciphertext.27 In a good cryptographic system,
the algorithm used does not need to be secret because the security of the
encryption depends only on the secrecy of the key. 28 To explain
cryptography, assume Alice and Bob want to communicate with each
other, and Eve is eavesdropping on their communication channel,
whatever the channel may be. 29 It is assumed that Eve is able to intercept
cooperation of certificate authorities, stealing cryptographic keys, taking advantage of predictable
random number generators, side-channel attacks, and submarine tapping. See Making and
Breaking Codes, ARJZ. ST. U., http://cactus.eas.asu.edu/partha/Columns/03-19-encryption.htm
(last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (discussing different techniques to break code).
19. MARK STAMP & RIcHARD M. Low, APPLIED CRYPTANALYSIS-BREAKING CIPHERS IN THE
REAL WORLD 2 (2007).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. Ross, COMPUTER NETWORKING A TOP DOWN APPROACH
691 (5th ed. 2010).
23. STAMP&LOw,supranote 19, at 2.
24. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 692.
25. Margaret Rouse, Key, TECHTARGET, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/
key (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
26. Id.
27. STAMP&Low, supranote 19, at 2.
28.

NIELS FERGUSON ET AL., CRYPTOGRAPHY ENGINEERING 24 (2010) (Describing how

keeping the algorithm secret is more difficult and expensive because it is built into the hardware
or software making it harder to change if necessary).
29. Id.
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every message that Alice and Bob send to each other. To protect their
communication, Alice and Bob agree on a secret key via some channel
that Eve cannot eavesdrop on. The key is used to create ciphertext
(encrypt the messages) that Alice and Bob send back and forth to each
other. 30 When Bob receives the encrypted message he uses a decryption
function to convert it into plaintext. 3 1 When Eve intercepts the message
she will not be able to figure out anything more than the approximate
length of the message and the time it was sent.32 These principles have
applications beyond just the transfer of communication. 33For example,
stored data is also often encrypted in case it is ever stolen.
Public key encryption is a widely used form of encryption. In public
34
key encryption, Bob generates a pair of keys using a special algorithm.
One of the keys is used to encrypt data and the other key is used to decrypt
data. 35 Bob publishes the encryption key so everyone can use it to encrypt7
messages or data. 36 Bob, however, keeps the decryption key secret.1
When Alice wants to send a message to Bob she encrypts the message
with the public key to get the cipher text.38 Bob can then use his secret
key and the decryption algorithm to decrypt the message. 39 In the real
world, people and businesses need to communicate with many other
parties securely. As scale increases, it becomes more difficult to keep
track of all the keys that different parties are using. 4 1 Certificate
authorities are used to make sure that a key is really Bob's key and not
something Eve published while impersonating Bob. 4 1 A certificate
authority is typically a trusted, third-party company. 42 It signs the public
key using a digital signature allowing Alice to verify that the public key
actually belongs to Bob.43 Certificate authorities allow cryptography to
work on a large scale.4 4

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Comodo,

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
See MARK
Id.

STAMP, INFORMATION SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 20 (2011).

FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 30.
There are many companies that act as certificate authorities including VeriSign,
and GoDaddy.
43. FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 28, at 30.
44. A Cryptography Policy Frameworkfor Electronic Commerce: Building Canada's
Information Economy and Society, Industry Canada (1998).
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B. Use of Cryptographyon the Internet-Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
45
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS),
provide "confidentiality, data integrity, and end-point authentication [to
the server and client]. 46 SSL is used by nearly all websites that allow
commercial transactions (this includes Amazon, eBay, Yahoo!, MSN,
and essentially all banks).4 7 When a website is using SSL, a padlock icon
appears in the browser near the URL and the URL starts with "https"
instead of http.48
The following example is borrowed from Kurose & Ross and helps
explain the need for SSL. 4 9 A normal guy named Bob wishes to buy shoes
from Alice incorporated, a company that has a website to facilitate
purchases. The Alice Incorporated site allows Bob to select the shoe style
and quantity desired and to input his address and credit card number. Bob
submits his information and expects to receive the shoes he ordered and
a charge for his order on his credit card. 50 This type of online purchase
would not work if Bob and Alice Incorporated did not use security
measures. 5 1 If encryption is not used, an attacker Eve, could intercept
Bob's order and obtain his payment card information.5 2 Eve would then
be able to use Bob's credit card to make her own purchases.5 3 If some
form of data integrity is not used, Eve could change any aspect of Bob's
order. She could make him purchase two pairs of shoes instead of only
one or change the mailing address. 54 If some form of server authentication
is not used, Eve could pretend to be Alice Incorporated and make a server
display Alice Incorporated's famous logo. 55 After Bob submits his order,
Eve could take Bob's money and run. 56 In addition, Eve could commit
identity theft by using the information that Bob submitted.5 7
SSL is a transport protocol that allows data to be exchanged over the
internet securely and has three phases called the handshake, key

45. TLS is a slightly modified version of SSL version 3. 1 will refer to both SSL and TLS
as SSL.
46. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 94.
47. Id. at 727.
48. Id.
49. For the original example, see id. at 727-28.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 728.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See Amadou Diallo, How to AvoidData Theft When UsingPublic Wi-FI,FORBES (Mar.
23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2014/03/04/hackers-love-public-wi-fi-butyou-can-make-it-safe/ (describing how SSL can create privacy and security for internet users).
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derivation, and data transfer phases. 58 Throughout the following
discussion, Bob is the client and Alice is the server. Alice has a
private/public59 key pair and a certificate that "binds her identity to her
public key.",

For this Article, the handshake phase is the most important part of SSL
to understand. During the handshake phase Bob needs to (1) connect with
Alice; (2) confirm that Alice is really Alice; (3) and send Alice a master
secret key, which will be used to create other keys needed for the SSL
session. 6' To start the handshake, Bob sends a hello message. 6 ' Alice
sends back her certificate containing her public key. 62 Understanding the
certificate is essential to understanding man in the middle attacks (one
method to circumvent encryption) which will be discussed in Part IV. If
Bob is able to confirm the certificate that Alice sent him with a Certificate
Authority then he will trust Alice and the transaction will continue (this
is essentially all done automatically by the software).63 If the certificate
is not confirmed by the Certificate Authority then an error message will
be given.

64

Next, Bob generates the master secret key (MS) that will be used for
the current SSL session. 65 Bob encrypts the MS with Alice's public key
and sends it to Alice. 66 Alice is able to decrypt the MS with her private
68
key.67 Thus, only Bob and Alice know the MS for this SSL session.
During the handshake phase Bob and Alice agree on which cryptographic
algorithms to use. 69 RSA and Diffie-Hellman are commonly used
algorithms in public key cryptography. 70 Alice and Bob next use the MS
Bob
to generate several keys to use throughout the SSL session.71 Now
72
safely.
internet
the
over
forth
and
back
data
send
and Alice can
58.

KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 729.

59.
60.

Id. at 730-31.
STAMP, supra note 36, at 354.

61. Id.
62. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 730-31.
63. Id. at 729-30.
64.

Securing Communications with Secure Socket Layer (SSL), MICROSOFT, http://msdn.

microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd16353 .aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).
65.

KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 730.

66. Id.
67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.
70.

Id. at 732.
Margaret

Rouse,

RSA

Algorithm

(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman),

TECHTARGET,

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/RSA (last visited Nov. 28, 2014) (describing how
RSA works); Margaret Rouse, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (exponential key exchange),

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Diffie-Hellman-key-exchange
visited Nov. 28, 2014) (describing Diffie-Hellman).
71. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 730.
72. Id. at 731.
TECHTARGET,

(last
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C. Networking and How Data Travels Over the Internet
The boundaries of a state's territory play an important role in
international law and serve a key role in delineating a state's exercise of
sovereignty. To determine whether international law is violated when
data is intercepted while traveling through the internet, it is important to
understand how data travels. The simple truth is that the protocols used
by the internet in no way take into account the physical location of states'
borders. The internet today is based on the Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) model.73 It contains seven layers.7 4 The third layer of OSI is known
as the network layer and it determines the path that packets 75 take from
senders to receivers. 76 There are two main routing algorithms that
determine the paths of packets.77 The first algorithm determines how data
travels within a network or within an autonomous system (AS). 78 "An AS
is a collection of routers whose prefixes and routing policies are under
common administrative control. ' 79 For example, a university or business
will often operate its own AS. 80 The second routing algorithm determines
8
how data travels between one AS and another. 1
If a router is not directly connected to the destination address, it must
send the data along a path hopping from router to router until it reaches
the destination address.82 Thus, as data travels over the internet it hops
from router to router until it reaches its final destination. 83 Routers within
an AS all use the same routing algorithm and they know information
about each other. 84 They communicate with each other periodically to
update who their neighbors are and to find out possible routes. 85

73. The Open System Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model, THE TCP/IP GUIDE,
http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/t-TheOpenSystemlnterconnectionOSIReferenceModel.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
74. Id.
75. Data travels over the internet in packets. See Margaret Rouse, Packet, TECHTARGET,
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/packet (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
76. The Open System Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model, THE TCP/IP GUIDE,
http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/tTheOpenSystemlnterconnectionOSlReferenceModel.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
77. Paul Krzyzanowski, Understanding Autonomous Systems, RUTGERS (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.cs.rutgers.edu/-pxk/352/notes/autonomous systems.html.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Margaret Rouse, Autonomous System (AS), TECHTARGET, http://searchnetworking.
techtarget.com/definition/autonomous-system (last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
81. Krzyzanowski, supra note 77.

82.

KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 394.

83.
84.

Id. at 374.
Id. at 394.

85. Id.
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1. Routing Between Networks: Border Gate-way Protocol
is the routing algorithm that
The Border Gate-Way Protocol (BGP)
87
86
governs the inter-AS transfer of data. BGP is extremely complex.
Whole books have been written on it and it can take years to master. 88 It
provides each AS a means to obtain outside AS reachability information
from bordering ASes. 89 The BGP algorithm determines good routes to
information and on AS policy that is
destinations based on reachability
90
decided by AS administrators.
BGP route selection rules are very complicated. According to BGP,
when a router needs to find a path to a destination, it first finds all possible
routes to the destination. 9' If more than one route exists to the destination,
the router selects a route which is primarily based on policy decisions
made by the AS's network administration. 92 If more than one route
remains after eliminating all other routes based on policy decisions, then
the routes with the shortest paths (the smallest number of router hops) are
then the algorithm
selected.93 If more than one route still remains,
94
criteria.
other
on
based
routes
down
narrows
2. Routing Policy
Path finding in BGP is primarily based on policy decisions made by
the AS administrator. 95 This makes path finding more complicated. If a
router knows of a path from point A through itself to point C, it may not
advertise it to other routers due to policy. 96 In this way, it can prevent
itself from transferring a packet that the administrator does not want it to
transfer. 97 "[F]or example, a rule such as 'router x, belonging to
organization y should not forward any packets originating from the
network owned by organization Z' can be implemented by the
86.

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),

TECHOPEDIA,

http://www.techopedia.com/

definition/6193/border-gateway-protocol-bgp (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
87. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 401.
88. Id.
89. BGP, supra note 86.
90. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 400.
91.

Ivan

Pepelnjak,

BGP Troubleshooting: Advanced Approach, TECHTARGET,

http://searchtelecom.techtarget.com/feature/BGP-essentials-The-protocol-that-makes-the-Interne
t-work (last visited Dec. 5, 2014).
92. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 404.
93. Id. at 405.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 404.
96. CIsco lOS IP CONFIGURATION GUIDE, RELEASE 12.2, at IPC-372 (2006), available at
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/1 2_2/ip/configuration/guide/fiprc/ cfindep.html#wp
1001343.
97. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 404.
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administrator of an AS.9 8 Policies have developed according to the
problems that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have faced. 99 Two
researchers categorized the policies into several groups including (1)
policies based on economic relationships an ISP has with its neighboring
ISP; (2) policies based on the need to control traffic flow and to avoid
overloading routers; and (3) security related policies to protect against
00
cyberattacks.' 1
This discussion on how routes are selected over the internet shows
that state borders and territory do not play a role in determining routes.
Invariably some data sent over the internet crosses through multiple state
borders.' 0 1 Even when two people send data within state A, it is possible
that the data travels through state B because BGP does not account for
state borders when finding routes. 10 2 This unique characteristic of the
internet allows states to gather and decrypt data from many other states
as the data crosses borders. This is important because the law of
sovereignty is heavily based on territory and state borders. 103 Sovereignty
allows states to take advantage of algorithms that do not account for state
borders when transferring data. 10 4 In the next Part, I will summarize the
aspects of sovereignty that apply to gathering data and breaking
encryption.
III. SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGNTY

According to the international legal principle of sovereignty, states
have a number of rights that come with a number of obligations. 0 5 These
rights allow states to gather and decrypt data in many instances. 10 6
Conversely, the obligations given to states through sovereignty describe
what types of actions taken while gathering and decrypting data would
violate international law.10 7

98. Id. at 374.
99. Matthew Caesar & Jennifer Rexford, BGP Routing Policies in ISP Networks,
PRINCETON, http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-jrex/papers/policies.pdf(last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
100.
101.
2015).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Eric Jensen, Cyber Sovereignty: The Way Ahead, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 7 (forthcoming
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part V.
Jensen, supra note 101.
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A. Rights and Obligations of Sovereignty
Sovereignty gives states the right to deal with each other as equals
under the law. 10 8 "The United Nations are based on the principle of
sovereign equality of all its members and preserving state sovereignty is
a top priority for both international organizations and individual
states." 109 States have an equal right to use resources from the global
commons.1 10 Likewise, when states act, they must take into consideration
the rights of other sovereign states especially with regard to the global
commons, natural resources, the environment, and events during armed
conflicts. 11 A state must take into account other states' interests when it
makes decisions" 2 and must avoid harming another state's ability to
exercise its rights. 1 3 States are also obligated to solve disputes
peacefully. 114
States have exclusive power over their own territory." 5 Territory
includes "land territory, internal waters, territorial sea (including bed and
subsoil), archipelagic waters, or national airspace."" 6 According to the
arbitral decision in Island of Palmas, "[s]overeignty in the relations
between States signifies independence." 117 "Independence in regard to a
portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
other State, the functions of a State." ' 1 8 This notion of exclusivity is
further confirmed by the International Court of Justice which stated that
sovereignty is the "body of rights and attributes which a State possesses
in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States.""' 9 By extension of
108. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 447 (8th
ed. 2012).
109. Andrew Liaropoulos, Exercising State Sovereignty in Cyberspace: An International
Cyber-Order Under Construction?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INT'L CONF. ON INFORMATION
WARFARE AND SECURITY 137-38 (Mar. 2013).
110. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 117 (1989).

111. Jensen, supranote 101 (manuscript at 14).
112. George K. Walker, Defining Terms in the 1982 UNCLOS Convention IV: The Last
Round of Definitions Proposedby the InternationalLaw Association (AmericanBranch) Law of
the Sea Committee, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 174 (2005).
113. Chinthaka Mendis, Sovereignty vs. Trans-boundary Environmental Harm: The
Evolving InternationalLaw Obligationsand the Sethusamuduram Ship ChannelProject, at 5455, United Nations (2006), available at http://www.un.org/depts/Ios/nippon/unnff programme_
home/fellowspages/fellowspapers/mendis_0607 sri lanka.pdf.
114. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4, arts. 33-38.
115. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 25.

116. Id.
117. Island ofPalmas (Neth. v. United States), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1928).
118. Id.
119. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 6,43 (Apr. 9, 1949) (individual
opinion of Judge Alvarez).
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their right to exclusivity, states have the right to use domestic resources
120
however they see fit.

States have exclusive power over the populations that lives in their

territories' 2 1 as well as things located on their territories. 122 Thus, objects
that are within a state's territory but not owned by the state are still subject
to any laws that the state imposes on those objects. 123 States exercise

sovereignty over cyber infrastructure and any activities associated with
the infrastructure that is located on their territory. 12 4 States also exercise

exclusive jurisdiction over objects that are not within their territory but
have sovereign immunity. 125 Further, each state has the authority to
control "access to and egress from its territory" including access for all
26
forms of communication.'
There are, however, limitations on a state's exclusivity of power over
its territory. Limitations can come from Security Council actions, the law
of armed conflict, fundamental human rights, and any area that the state
127
consents to be bound by a treaty.

In addition, territorial sovereignty comes with several obligations.
States must respect the territorial sovereignty of other states. 12 8 This
prohibits states from entering a foreign state and asserting their will
without permission. 129 States also have a duty to prevent trans-boundary
harm. 130 A state may not knowingly allow its territory to be used to harm

120. lnaamul Haque & Ruxandra Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for
Development: Response Sought from InternationalEconomic Law, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 219, 249-50 (2004):
Under customary international law, principles of sovereignty support a state's
clear right to regulate commercial activities within its borders. This power is
extensive and encompasses such issues as capacity to engage in business, forms
of business enterprises, conditions of continuance of a business, and regulations
of capital markets as well as those of foreign capital inflows and outflows.
121. CRAWFORD, supra note 108, at 447; Von Heinegg, supra note 12, at 124 (referencing
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-20 (Sept. 7)); Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 166-69 (June 7).
122. Von Heinegg, supra note 12, at 130.
123. Jensen, supra note 101 (manuscript at 20).
124. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 16. Cyber infrastructure is defined as "the
communications, storage, and computing resources upon which information systems operate." Id.
at 24.
125. Von Heinegg, supra note 12, at 124.
126. Id.
127. Jensen, supra note 10 1 (manuscript at 11).
128. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 202 (June 27).
129. Id.
130. Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Alb), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9, 1949).
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another state. 13 1 This duty to prevent harm also applies to cyber
infrastructure and activities within its territory or under its exclusive
control.' 3 2 Similarly, states are obligated to protect the rights of other
states.' 33 States should "pass criminal laws, conduct investigation,
prosecute attackers, and cooperate with the victim-states of
cyberattacks.' 34 If a party causes harm from within a state's borders, the
state is required to either have had actual knowledge of the harm or be in
35
a position where it should have had knowledge to be held responsible.
A possible emerging norm is that states have the obligation to "monitor
' 36
cyber infrastructure and take proactive measures to prevent harm."'
Further, states have the right to monitor, maintain, and repair their sea
cables' 37 Thus, states that use submarines to tap submarine cables must
be careful to not interfere with those rights.
B. Protectionsfor Diplomatic Communications
Diplomatic archives and communications are protected under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 138 Diplomatic archives are
protected "at all times and wherever they may be."' 139 This applies to both
situations when there is no armed conflict as well as during armed
conflicts.14° According to the Tallinn Manual,"[d]iplomatic archives and
communications are protected from cyber operations at all times"
14 1
regardless of whether the state is part of an armed conflict or not.
Protections for diplomatic communications are also based in customary
international law as shown by state practice. 142 Protections given to

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Jensen, supra note 101, manuscript, at 25.
Id. manuscript, at 26.
Id.
Id. manuscript, at 27.

136.

Id. manuscript, at 27-28.

137. See R. Beckman, Submarine Cables -A CriticallyImportant but Neglected Area of the
Law of the Sea, at 2, presented at Indian Society of Int'l Law, 7th Int'l Conference on Legal
Regimes of Sea, Air, Space and Antarctica, New Delhi, Jan. 15-17, availableat http://cil.nus.edu.
sg/wp/wpcontent/uploads/20 I0/01/Beckman-PDF-ISlL-Submarine-Cables-rev-8-Jan- 10.pdf.
138. Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 60.
139. Id. arts. 33, 35.
140. Id. art. 27(a) ("[T]he receiving State shall, even in case of armed conflict, respect and
protect the consular premises, together with the property of the consular post and the consular
archives ... ").
141. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 233; see Vienna Convention, supra note 14, arts.
33, 35; see also Tehran Hostages case, 1 61-62, 77, 86.
142. See S.C. Res. 667, 1 (Sept. 16, 1990); S.C. Res. 674, 1 (Oct. 29, 1990) (condemning

Iraq's violation of diplomatic premises during its invasion of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 667, 13 (Sept.
16, 1990) (demanding compliance with consular protections even though Iraq was involved in an

international armed conflict).
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diplomatic communications include respect for their confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. 43 This requires a state to not interfere with
44
their transmission or reception. 1
In summary, the law of sovereignty provides for a number of rights
for states. The rights are heavily based on the state's territory and they
allow the state to control the flow of communication into and out of its
borders. In addition, states that operate submarine cables on the high seas
have the right to monitor and maintain them. Finally, diplomatic
communications are protected from cyberattacks at all times.
IV. How SOVEREIGNTY APPLIES TO GATHERING DATA AND
BREAKING ENCRYPTION GENERALLY

The preceding discussion on sovereignty helps determine whether,
given a particular situation, gathering and decrypting data violates
another state's sovereignty or not. This section will discuss some
principles created by the law of sovereignty that apply to breaking
encryption and gathering data.
Diplomatic communications are protected at all times.' 45 Thus, a state
must be careful not to violate those protections when gathering data. One
way a state might go about gathering and decrypting data is as follows:
during the process of downloading and decrypting data, a state could
make an initial determination that the data might qualify as a diplomatic
communication. If such a determination is made, the state could stop
decryption and stop using the data until a full legal review is made. It
could continue to download the data just in case the full legal review
concludes that the data does not qualify as protected. Finally, if a legal
analysis concludes that the data is protected, then the state must stop
gathering the data and must delete any data it has stored from the
protected communication.
Due to the principle of territorial sovereignty, a state can do nearly
anything it wants within its own borders. 146 Thus, if the process of
downloading the data and decrypting it occurs entirely within a State's
territory or on the high seas, then the action does not violate another
state's sovereignty. This means that the downloaded data must have been
143.

Terry Chia, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability: The Three Components of the CIA

Triad, IT SECURITY COMMUNITY BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012), http://security.blogoverflow.com/2012/

O8/confidentiality-integrity-availability-the-three-components-of-the-cia-triad/.
144.
145.

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 24.
Infra Part III.B.

146. See Von Heinegg, supra note 12, at 126-27; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 1618 (discussing principles of sovereignty as they relate to cyber law); U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea arts. 86, 89, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, availableat http://www.un.org/depts/
los/conventionagreements/texts/unclos/unclose.pdf.
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located on a server or traveling through1 4 7cables or routers within the state's
territory or on or under the high seas.
By the extension of sovereign rights, a state may share any data
gathered from within its territory with any other state.' 48 By sharing the
data, neither the sharing state nor the receiving state would be violating
another state's sovereignty. One state may even allow another state's
49
personnel to do the gathering and decrypting work on its territory.1
For non-state actors, any actions performed would be subject to the
domestic law of the state where the action took place. 150 Depending on
the state's domestic law, it may be that a crime is committed when a nonstate actor downloads and decrypts data traveling on the internet.
One particularly difficult question is whether installing malware on
computers in a foreign state violates that state's sovereignty. According
to the Tallinn Manual, a cyberoperation against another state violates that
state's sovereignty if it causes damage.' 5 1 Downloading data and
breaking encryption, however, usually does not cause any physical
damage. 152 The Tallinn Manual further states that "[t]he International
Group of Experts could achieve no consensus as to whether the placement
of malware that causes no physical damage (as with malware used to
monitor activities) constitutes a violation of sovereignty."' 53 Although
there is no firm consensus, installing malware that causes no physical
damage might not be a violation of another state's sovereignty because
regularly install malware in other states without any
states seem to
54
punishment. 1

147. See Von Heinegg, supra note 146; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13; U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 146.
148. See Von Heinegg, supra note 146; TALLINN MANUAL, supranote 13; U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 146.
149. NSA Encryption, PRODUCTS CRYPTO MUSEUM, http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/
usa/nsa.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2014); Von Heinegg, supra note 12, at 126-27.
150. Jessica Howley, The Non-State Actor and InternationalLaw: A Challenge to State
Primacy?, Dialogue e-Journal at 2-3.
151. TALLINNMANUAL, SUpra note 13, at24.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, China Suspected of Breaching US. Postal Service
Computer Networks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/1 1/1 0/china-suspected-of-breaching-u-s-postal-service-computer-net
works/; Danny Yadron & Siobhan Gorman, Hacking Trail Leads to Russia, Experts Say, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/hacking-trail-leads-to-russia-experts-say1414468869.
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APPLIES TO SPECIFIC

METHODS OF BREAKING ENCRYPTION

Cryptography is often much more secure in theory than in practice.' 55
Often many security weaknesses can be found after examining the
"context of a specific implementation and the larger system in which it
resides."' 156 To defeat cryptography, governments and, to a lesser extent,
non-state actors have a variety of techniques at their disposal. Some
possible techniques include taking advantage of software vulnerabilities
to steal the digital keys used to encrypt data; using superfast computing
power to break weak encryption; and in the case of state actors,
cooperating with companies to circumvent encryption altogether.1 57 This
section will discuss several methods that can be used to break encryption.
After each method, I will apply the legal principles discussed above and
discuss when a particular method might violate another state's
sovereignty.
A. Brute ForceAttacks
1. How it Works
One commonly used method is known as brute force. 15 8 If Eve has a
ciphertext she may be able to decrypt it by computing numerous keys and
trying each one until she finds one that works. 159 This attack is often used
when trying to learn a user's password.160 After stealing a file containing
encrypted passwords, Eve can try encrypting words from a dictionary.'61
If the encryption matches one of the encrypted passwords, then Eve has
effectively decrypted the password. 162 If she knows what user the
password belonged to then she can gain access to the system. 163 This
attack works because people are not willing to memorize very long
passwords. 164 Computers have become fast enough to try billions of
155.

STAMP, supra note 36, at 218.

156. Id.
157. Tom Simonite, NSA Leak Leaves Crypto-Math Intact but Highlights Known
Workarounds, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/
519171/nsa-leak-leaves-crypto-math-intact-but-highlights-known-workarounds/.
158. Kevin Parrish, NSA Hasn't Cracked Basic Internet Encryption (Yet), Bus. INSIDER
(Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/encryption-nsa-edward-snowden-rsa-ssl,news17503.html
159. TECHREPUBLIC, PASSWORD CRACKING/BRuTE-FORCE TOOLS 208 (3d. 2006).
160. Id. at 196.
161. Id.
162. Id.at 208.
163. Id. at 209.
164. BRUCE SCHNEIER, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY 166 (2008).

BREAKING ENCRYPTION AND GATHERING DATA: INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICATIONS

2015]

55

passwords per second. 65 Thus, passwords that are common words, or
that are too short (usually less than 13 letters) are easy to
passwords
66
crack. 1

The New York Times has reported that the NSA uses supercomputers
to break encryption.1 67 Supercomputers would be well-suited to perform
brute force attacks because they can perform a great number of
calculations per second. It has been reported that the NSA can
"overpower a relatively weak form of encryption used by most websites
that offer secure SSL connections."1

68

Most sites that use SSL also use

1 69
the RSA encryption algorithm with keys that are 1024 bits long.
However, "experts have cautioned for years that longer keys are needed
to defend against an attacker with the resources of a government agency
or large company."' 170 Google, for example, has switched to using RSA
keys that are 2048 bits long. 17 1 Some cryptographic algorithms are not
able to withstand brute force attacks as well as others. For example, due
to its weakness against brute force attacks, Microsoft has advised
developers to stop using the SHA-1 hash algorithm. 172 If companies were
to use larger bit keys like 2048 or 4096 bit keys, then brute force would
because it would take computers too long to figure
be much more difficult
73

out the correct key. 1

2. How the Law Applies
Brute force attacks can be performed after the data is gathered or
perhaps even as it is being gathered. The attacks only require local
computing power and can be performed without using foreign resources
or performing computations on foreign soil. Because a state has exclusive
power over its own territory, this kind of computing will not violate any

165.

Dan Goodin, 25-GPUCluster CracksEvery StandardWindows Passwordin <6 Hours,

ARs TECHNICA, (Dec. 9, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/12/25-gpu-cluster-cracksevery-standard-windows-password-in-6-hours/ (discussing a setup that can try 350 billion
passwords per second).
166. Id.
167. Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y.

TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-intemet-encrypt
ion.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
168.

Simonite, supra note 157.

169.
170.

Id.
Id. (the longer a key is, the harder it is to crack using brute force).

171.

Michael Mimoso, How the NSA CouldBe BreakingSSL, THREAT POST (Dec. 4, 2013),

http://threatpost.com/how-the-nsa-could-be-breaking-ss/103091.
172. Id.
173. Id; Dan Goodin, SHAI Crypto Algorithm UnderpinningInternet Security Could Fall
by 2018, ARs TECHNICA, Oct. 6, 2012, http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/1 0/shal -crypto-algori
thm-could-fall-by-2018/.
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other state's sovereignty. 174 One potential violation is if the data is

gathered in foreign territory such as from an underwater sea cable located

in another state's territorial waters. 175 While states do not have sovereign
rights over areas on the high seas, they do have sovereign rights over their
own territorial waters. 176 Thus, if state B sends a submarine into the
territorial waters of state A without permission to gather data from its

submarine cables then state B would likely be violating state A's
sovereignty. However, in this kind of scenario, assuming the brute force
computations were to be performed after the submarine had left the
territory of state A, only the crossing into state A's territory to gather data
would be a violation. 177 Subsequent brute force computations on the high
seas or within state B's territory would not be a violation of

sovereignty. 178
B. Defeating Cryptographyby Obtainingthe Key

1. How it Works
Another method used to defeat encryption is to collect keys that are

used for encryption. 179 By taking advantage of software vulnerabilities or
social engineering, a hacker can gain full control over a server or
computer. 180 Once control is obtained, the hacker can steal any digital
keys that are stored on the server.18 1 Although this probably does not

work well when large numbers of computers need to be infiltrated, it can
be very effective against specific targets.'

82

States have been reported to

gather encryption keys from online services so they can easily decrypt

intercepted data.' 83 This method of attack works because one particular
key may be used over a long period of time.184 The effectiveness of this
174. See Von Heinegg, supra note 146; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13; U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 146.
175.

TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 25.
178. NSA Encryption, supra note 149; Von Heinegg, supra note 12.
179. Hiroshi Shinotsuka, How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates,
SYMANTEC (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-attackers-steal-priv
ate-keys-digital-certificates.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also Matthew Green, How Does the NSA Break SSL?, CRYPTOGRAPHY
ENGINEERING (Dec. 2, 2013), http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/how-does-nsabreak-ssl.html ("I'm well aware that NSA can install malware on your computer and own any
cryptography you choose. That doesn't interest me at all, for the simple reason that it doesn't scale
well. NSA can do this to you, but they can't do it for an entire population.").
183. Simonite, supra note 157.
184. Green, supra note 182 ("This issue is of particular concern in servers configured for
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attack could be minimized if companies185used perfect forward secrecy, a
technique in which keys are not reused.
2. How the Law Applies
The legal analysis of this type of attack depends on how the key used
for decryption is obtained. 186 Keys are often obtained by exploiting
software vulnerabilities on specific targets. 187 Some software
vulnerabilities will allow the attacker to install malware on the target
computer, enabling the attacker to do anything he or she wants with the
computer. 188 The legal conclusion depends heavily on whether installing
malware on a foreign computer amounts to a violation of that nation's
sovereignty. 89 According to the Tallinn Manual, no consensus was
achieved in situations where malware that allowed spying was installed
but where no permanent damage to property occurred.' 90 Stealing keys
from a server would likely not cause permanent damage to property
because it involves simply locating the key on the server's memory and
sending it over the internet to another computer.' 9 ' Because the law is
unclear on whether installing malware to gather cryptographic keys
violates sovereignty or not, a conclusion cannot be made in either
direction.
C. Man in the Middle Attacks
1. How it Works
In a man in the middle attack, "the attacker intercepts messages in a
public key exchange and then retransmits them, substituting his own
public key for the requested one, so that the two original parties still
appear to be communicating with each other."' 92 The communications
the TLS RSA handshake, where a single 128-byte server key is all you need to decrypt every past
and future connection made from the device.").
185. Parker Higgins, Pushing for Perfect Forward Secrecy, an Important Web Privacy
Protection,ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/

Simonite, supra
2013/08/pushing-perfect-forward-secrecy-important-web-privacy-protection;
note 157 ("The value of stealing keys can be mostly neutralized if Internet providers adopt a
technique called perfect forward secrecy, in which keys aren't reused. So far Google and a few
other companies have adopted it.").
186. Higgins, supra note 185.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.

189. Id.
190.
191.
192.

See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, at 16-18.
Id.
Margaret Rouse, Man in the Middle Attack (Fire Brigade Attack), TECHTARGET,

http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/man-in-the-middle-attack

(last visited Nov. 28,
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appear to be going directly to the intended party but in reality, the
messages are intercepted and can be tampered with before reaching their
final destination. 193 It is possible to avoid cryptography altogether with
this type of attack. 194 It has been reported that either the GCHQ or NSA
uses this method to intercept internet traffic. 195 One of the agencies
"appears to have hacked into a target's Internet router and covertly
redirected targeted Google traffic using a fake security certificate so it
could intercept the information in unencrypted format."' 196 Some security

bloggers have speculated that this is done with the cooperation of Google
and some other companies.' 97 Some companies like Google and
Microsoft act as their own Certificate Authority. 198 Thus, they would be
able to give a third party a certificate and validate it too. 199 The third party
would then be able to act as a man in the middle, intercepting traffic that
was intended for Google or some other company's website.2 °° Using this
method, an attacker would be able to read all the traffic for a given SSL
session because the attacker has the certificate and all keys associated
20 1
with the session.
The entire process could work as follows: first a user sends a request
to a Google server. 20 2 A hacked router then reroutes requests from
targeted senders to a man in the middle (MITM) server.20 3 The MITM
server would then be able to read and tamper with the request before
forwarding it on to the legitimate Google server.20 4 The Google server
then sends back the requested information to the MITM server. 20 5 The
MITM server will then have the ability to read and tamper again with the
information from Google. 20 6 Finally, the MITM server forwards the
2014).

193. Id.
194. Id
195. Simonite, supra note 157.
196. Ryan Gallagher, New Snowden Documents Show NSA Deemed Google Networks a
"Target," SLATE (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/futuretense/2013/09/09/shifling_
shadowstormbrew flyingpignew_snowdendocumentsshow nsa deemed.html.
197. Paul Bauer, How the NSA Bypasses Online Encryption, BAUER-POWER, http://www.
bauer-power.net/2013/09/how-nsa-bypasses-online-encryption.html#.VGttI8lL82Y (last visited
Nov. 28, 2014).
198. For example, if you go to www.google.com, you can click on the padlock icon that
appears next to the URL. Upon clicking, a message appears showing that the certificate is verified
by Google Inc.
199. Gallagher, supra note 196.
200. Bauer, supra note 197.
201.

Id.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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requested information to the original User. 20 7 Throughout this process the
user would be unaware that there is a third party intercepting all of the
traffic. 20 8 Even if this type of attack is not currently being used by any
state, it is a possible method for circumventing encryption.20 9
2. How the Law Applies
This type of attack requires (1) hacking into and taking control of a
router; and (2) obtaining and using a certificate that has been falsely
authenticated by a certificate authority. 2 10 In other words, the certificate
authority authenticates the certificate even though it knows that the party
that is using the certificate is not who the user thinks is using the
certificate.2 1 1 If the router is located within the state's territory then a state
would not violate sovereignty by taking control of the router. 2 12 Hacking
would likely cause no physical damage to the router or anything else
because the purpose of the hacking is to reroute the information to another
MITM server. Thus, even if the router were located in another state, the
hacking might not be a violation of that state's sovereignty. However,
there is no consensus on whether such a hack would be a violation of
sovereignty.
Obtaining a falsely authenticated certificate would require a state to
cooperate with a company that acts as a certificate authority.2 13 The
company would need to give the state certificates and make sure that the
certificates remain certified. This kind of cooperation would not violate
another state's sovereignty even if the company is located in a foreign
state. One scenario might involve state A cooperating with a company
located in state B to obtain certificates. State A could then use those
certificates to carry out MITM attacks against state or non-state actors
located in state C. State B does not have a duty to prevent the company
from handing over authenticated certificates to state A. Any violation of
sovereignty would not occur until the certificate is used improperly. State
A would likely not be violating state C's sovereignty as long as it is
207. Id.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.

210. Id.
211.

Id.

212.
213.

Id.
Although it is possible to steal and use a certificate (similar to what was done with

Stuxnet), cooperation would be needed in the long term. As soon as the certificate is discovered
to have been stolen, the certificate authority will revoke it and the certificate will no longer be
trusted. See Revoking an SSL Certificate, GODADDY, https://support.godaddy.com/help/article/
4747/revoking-an-ssl-certificate (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). For a discussion on Stuxnet, see Ralph
Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge, LANGNER (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.langner.com/en/
wp-content/uploads/2013/11 /To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf.
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simply gathering data for intelligence purposes. It might be possible for
state A to violate state C's sovereignty if it were to make substantial
changes to the information from state C that is en route to state B. For
example, if state A were to change equipment orders so that they were
shipped to state A instead of state C then it might be a violation of state
C's sovereignty.
Because sovereignty is heavily based on territory, it may be necessary
in some situations to track where connections are made (it is possible to
track where connections are made2 14). Although it may take extra
resources to figure out where connections to foreign servers are made,
tracking connections may be necessary to make sure a state is not
violating another state's sovereignty.
D. Take Advantage of PredictableRandom Number Generators
1. How it Works
Random number generators (RNG) play an important part in SSL and
have recently come under scrutiny. There is evidence suggesting that
RNGs have been compromised by government agencies. 2 15 However,
some experts qfiestion whether tampering actually occurred.216 In this
subsection, I will only address sovereignty in relation to taking advantage
of a RNG that is known to be predictable. The law applicable to the
intentional placement of flaws in RNGs is a separate issue.
In cryptography, random numbers are used in algorithms such as RSA
and Diffie-Hellman to make them work properly. Specifically, RNGs are
used to generate "RSA key pairs (i.e. randomly selected large primes),
and Diffie-Hellman secret exponents."2 '17 To summarize, the keys used in
public key cryptography are created by using RNGs. For cryptography to
work properly, the numbers must not only be statistically random, but
they must also be unpredictable (there is a difference between random
and unpredictable).218 If RNGs used in the popular encryption methods
are compromised, then anyone may be able to predict the keys used in
214. KUROSE & Ross, supra note 22, at 43 (discussing the Traceroute program that can
report the routers that packets travel through back to the user).
215. NSA 'Altered Random-Number Generator,' BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.
bbc.com/news/technology-24048343 (stating that the NSA had "written a flaw into a randomnumber generator that would allow the agency to predict the outcome of the algorithm").
216. Simonite, supra note 157 (stating that "the standard, DualECDRBG, was always too
slow to see widespread use. If the flaw was planted by the NSA, it was an unsubtle and poorly
targeted plan, says Callas.").
217. STAMP, supra note 36, at 145. RSA and Diffie-Hellman are widely used cryptographic
algorithms. See Carlos Frederico Cid, Cryptanalysis of RSA: A Survey (2003), available at
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encryption and decrypt any ciphertext that used the encryption method.
For example, assume Eve, Alice, and Bob all have cryptographic keys
generated by the same system. With predictable numbers, Alice and Bob
might team up and predict the key that Eve is using based on the numbers
used in their own keys.2 19 The security of the system could be
compromised with some collusion and guess work.22 °
Predictable random numbers could be attacked in at least a couple
different areas of an SSL session. If RSA is the chosen cryptographic
algorithm, a RNG is used on the client side to create the master secret key
(Bob, the customer, represented the client side in the SSL explanation in
Part II).221 If Diffie-Hellman is used, both the client and server sides use
RNGs because Diffie-Hellman requires a contribution from the client and
predictable then
the server.2 22 Similarly, in Diffie-Hellman, if the RNG is
22 3
an attacker would be able to decrypt the entire session.
2. How the Law Applies
Taking advantage of a predictable RNG requires (1) some kind of
ingenuity by the attacker to predict the key used in the encryption
algorithm; and (2) access to the data that is encrypted. As long as the data
is obtained without violating another state's sovereignty (i.e., the data is
obtained when it is traveling through the state's own territory or on the
high seas) then the entire decryption process will not violate sovereignty.
E. Side ChannelAttacks
1. How it Works
Side channel attacks can also be used to defeat encryption. Side
channel attacks require an additional channel of information about the
cryptographic system because they do not directly attack the
cryptographic algorithm. 2 24 The additional channel of information may
come from measurements of the time it takes to encrypt a message,
219.
220.
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magnetic fields surrounding the system, radio frequency emissions from
the system, and power consumption during the encryption or decryption
process.22 5 By gathering information from these other channels, an
attacker may be able to infer something about the key or the message
involved.2 26
Recently, researchers discovered how to break 4096-bit RSA by
listening to a computer with a microphone. 22 7 The researchers recorded
the high-pitched (10 to 150 KIz) sounds that are created when the
computer decrypts data. 22 8 The sound is created by "the CPU's voltage
regulator, as it tries to maintain a constant voltage during wildly varied
and bursty loads., 229 The researchers were able to discover the key that
was used from the sounds created, allowing them to decrypt any message
that is encrypted with that key.230 This technique would allow an attacker
to obtain a decryption key by placing his phone near a computer and
recording the sound that is made. 23 ' An attacker could also install
malware on a target's phone (through spear phishing or some other
method) and then remotely record the sound made by any computers
decrypting activities that the target has access to. 232 Attackers could also
build websites that listen to a computer's CPU when a target visits the
website because code used in websites (such as HTML5 and Flash) has
microphone access capabilities. 2 33 The researchers also mentioned that it
may be possible to place a microphone in an area where many servers are
located to obtain the keys used by the servers.23 4
The sound is created by "the CPU's voltage regulator, as it tries to
23 5
maintain a constant voltage during wildly varied and bursty loads."
The researchers were able to discover the key that was used from the
sounds created, allowing them to decrypt any message that is encrypted
with that key. 236 This technique would allow an attacker to obtain a
decryption key by placing his phone near a computer and recording the
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sound that is made.237 An attacker could also install malware on a target's
phone (through spear phishing or some other method) and then remotely
record the sound made by any computers decrypting activities that the
target has access to. 238 Attackers could also build websites that listen to a
computer's CPU when a target visits the website because code used in
websites (such as HTML5 and Flash) has microphone access
capabilities. 239 The researchers also mentioned that it may be possible to

where many servers are located to obtain
place a microphone in an area
240
the keys used by the servers.

2. How the Law Applies
If the target computer is physically located within the territory of the
state that is using a side-channel attack then the attack does not violate
sovereignty. 24 1 Domestic law would be required to prevent a state from
using such an attack. If a website or a user's computer is hacked, there is
no strong legal conclusion whether installing malware on a computer is a
violation of sovereignty. If a state places a listening microphone in a
server room in another country without permission then this is more
likely a violation of sovereignty. Placing a microphone in a foreign
country requires a state actor to enter the territory of another state and
interfere within the foreign state's borders.242
F. Submarine Tapping
1. How it Works
Submarine tapping may be a useful technique in gaining access to data
that might not otherwise enter a state's territory. If the tapping occurs on
the high seas, then no state can claim sovereignty over the location where
the tapping occurs. In 2005, the Associated Press reported that a
submarine, the USS Jimmy Carter, had been modified to carry crews of
technicians to tap fiber optic lines on the seabed.243 It is easiest to tap the
cables at the locations where the cables' signals are amplified allowing
them to travel long distances. 244 They are easier to tap at these locations
237.
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because each wire is treated individually instead of in a bundle. 245
However, submarine tapping may only be necessary for cables that are
not reachable through any ally state. If a state has access to locations
where the cables make landfall, then it will likely tap the cable on land
246
because it is easier.

2. How the Law Applies
Whether submarine cable tapping violates sovereignty depends on
where the tapping occurs and what kind of technique is used to tap the
cables. To avoid violating another state's sovereignty the tapping must
occur within the tapping state's territorial waters or on the high seas. 24 7
The technique used must be one that does not damage the cable or
interfere with the cable operating state's right to right to monitor,
maintain, and repair its submarine cables.248 Thus, the tapping must not
cause damage to the submarine cables and must not prevent the data
traveling through them from reaching its destination.
VI. CONCLUSION

Sovereignty gives states the right to intercept and decrypt data inside
their territory or on the high seas. There are several methods that can be
used to break cryptography. Whether the method violates another state's
sovereignty often depends on where physical actions take place and
whether the cyber infrastructure that is being attacked is located on
another state's territory. However, it is unclear whether defeating
encryption by attacking computers in foreign states violates sovereignty
or not. Finally, states must be careful of protections for diplomatic
communications as they gather and decrypt data.
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